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OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHERREL DRAPER and NELL FAIRBANKS 
DRAPER, his wife, J. B. DUNN and JULIET 
CRISMAN DUNN, his wife, JACK C. DUNN 
and GLADYS WILEY DUNN, his wife, GLEN 
DRAPER and LORNA F. DRAPER, his wife, 
R. L. REINSIMAR and MARGARET 
DRAPER REINSIMAR, his wife, ERNEST 
J. PEDLER and VIRGINIA A. PEDLER, 
his wife, HENRY L. BUTLER and VIVIENNE 
DRAPER BUTLER, his wife, and CHARLES 
P. RUDD and GLADYS M. RUDD, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
— vs. — 
J. B. and R. E. WALKER, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced in October, 1949, by the 
plaintiffs, all of whom except Charles P. Eudd and 
Gladys M. Eudd, the last named plaintiffs in the caption, 
were represented at the trial by MuUiner, Prince, and 
MuUiner, Mr. and Mrs. Eudd were represented by Irwin 
Clawson. The case went to trial in the fall of 1950. 
Case No. 
7685 
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As the trial developed it appeared that two distinct 
features of this nuisance were involved. The first was 
the matter of dust, noise and light as a nuisance. The 
second was a matter of the obliteration of a right of way. 
The factual situations as to each of these two problems 
were quite distinct, and for that reason they have been 
on this appeal briefed separately. This brief will only be 
concerned with the nuisance factor inasmuch as the prob-
lems of easements did not concern the clients represented 
by the writer hereof. 
The nuisance issue concerns questions and errors 
argued on this point by respondent as point II and point 
III of its brief. After consideration, counsel for respond-
ents were of the opinion that their respective positions 
could be put more distinctly if the factual situation on 
these two law points was stated and argued separately. 
Prior to making this statement, the attention of this 
court is directed to the fact that no exception is made, 
nor has error been assigned, on the ground that the evi-
dence is not sufficient to sustain the findings of the court 
to the effect that a nuisance was committed and existed 
as alleged in the complaint. Therefore, the character and 
the sufficiency of the evidence as presented will not be 
discussed except incidentally. 
Plaintiffs take exception to a number of assertions 
made in appellant's statement of facts as contained in 
its brief. These will be alluded to at the conclusion of 
this Statement of Facts. 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The site of this controversy is at the mouth of Cot-
tonwood Canyon, a few hundred yards east of the Old 
Mill property. Plaintiffs, their parents and families set-
tled in this particular district in the early 1920's. The 
homes were originally summer homes, but over the years 
were converted to comfortable, permanent houses with all 
modern conveniences. Their particular district was 
heavily wooded, with the advantage of the coolness inci-
dent to their proximity to the canyon in the summer. 
The area was also especially desirable because of the 
peace, quiet and isolation which these people sought and 
desire, and which motivated them to choose this particu-
lar place to live. 
In the summer of 1946, without any notice to plain-
tiffs or without any preliminary negotiations with them, 
defendant commenced work in establishing a very ex-
tensive sand and gravel crushing and processing plant. 
J. B. Walker was the only person regularly employed 
by defendant who testified at the trial. He is and was 
the general manager of defendant and the guiding factor 
in developing this operation. In his direct examination 
he testified that the beginning of construction commenced 
in June of 1946 and that in June and July of that year 
the pit floor was prepared by removing the underbrush, 
grading and changing the course of cottonwood creek. 
Mr. Walker referred extensively to notes which pur-
ported to convey accurate data. His purpose was obvious 
in that he tried to make it appear that his activities in 
this particular area had been going on for some time 
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prior to this suit. The fact of the matter is that in the 
latter part of August, 1946, no such activities had com-
menced. The only thing at that late date in the year 1946 
which had been accomplished was that some work had 
commenced in driving the tunnel under Wasatch Boule-
vard ; in fact, a trench half way across this thoroughfare 
had been dug. 
The court is referred to Exhibits YYY and ZZZ. 
These exhibits are aerial photographs which were taken 
August 16,1946. These pictures show that no work what-
soever had been started on what is now the pit floor, nor 
any work been done to the east of Wasatch Boulevard. 
Plaintiffs testified that this mountainside was defaced 
in 1947, and in view of these particular pictures plaintiff s' 
version as to this fact would seem to be the more reliable. 
The operation of this gravel plant is quite extensive, 
both as to area and construction. The panorama photo-
graphs, (Ex. B and Ex. H) together with a number of 
other photographs, show this accurately. The evidence 
shows, and there is little dispute that during the years 
1947 and early part of 1948 this plant was constructed. 
It began to operate in a somewhat tentative manner in 
July of 1948. Considerable mechanical difficulty appear-
ed, as could naturally be expected, which resulted in the 
operation being quite sporadic. During the operational 
part of 1948 the gravel was bulldozed from the mountain 
east of Wasatch Boulevard onto a grizzly, from which it 
dropped to a conveyor which carried the material be-
neath the Wasatch Boulevard by means of a tunnel to 
4 
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the crushing plant where it was crushed, graded, and 
otherwise classified, and from which it was removed by 
means of long conveyor belts to six storage piles. 
In the spring of 1949 another method of removal of 
this material from the mountain was devised. This was 
necessary a the result of a lawsuit by Salt Lake City 
against this defendant, with which this court is familiar. 
This action by Salt Lake City required the defendant to 
remove material from ground east of the city water con-
duit. Thereafter the material was mined a considerable 
distance east of the boulevard and was conveyed to the 
same grizzly by a conveyor belt and the material was 
dropped from the end of this conveyor onto the grizzly 
some 25 or 30 feet, as appears in the first two photo-
graphs of Exhibit W, and also in numerous other photo-
graphs. 
By handling this material that way, the "fines," 
which were the undesirable ingredient in this product as 
sand and gravel, were removed and blown away by the 
wind, which at this particular point in the mouth of the 
canyon blew almost constantly. 
By August of 1949 all the "bugs" were out of the 
plant and it started to produce sand and gravel steadily, 
and huge amounts of this product were amassed on de-
fendant's premises. 
One of the aggravating features of this operation 
was the noise produced by the crushing plant, the ma-
chinery used in conveying the material, and the heavy 
equipment used in and around these stock piles. 
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The most annoying result to these plaintiffs was the 
daily deposit of dust on their premises. This dust is 
practically powder, as testified to by Dr. Jones, the 
engineer from the University of Utah, who analyzed it 
at the pit, crusher, storage piles, outside the homes of 
plaintiffs and inside the homes of plaintiffs. The doctor's 
analysis is contained in Exhibits DDDD, EEEE and 
FFFF. He and Dr. Hawks testified this material was 
powder. It is interesting to note in this respect, how-
ever, that courser material was carried to these homes. 
This material was gathered inside and outside houses 
and was preserved, presented at the trial, and is con-
tained in boxes as a part of the record. The fact that 
this courser material traveled the distance from this plant 
to the homes conclusively demonstrates the direction and 
intensity of the winds in this vicinity. 
Photographs were taken during the year 1949 and 
during the summer immediately preceding the trial of 
this case at regular intervals. These exhibits were con-
solidated, dated and range from exhibit C to exhibit UU. 
These pictures, the dust and dirt actually collected, and 
the analysis of the scientists called by plaintiffs, also the 
direct testimony by plaintiffs and others, conclusively 
show the injustice, inconvenience and discomfort they 
underwent as a result of this plant being located and 
operated where it was and as it was. 
Defendant produced experts to refute this. These 
people purported to be advised in matters of sound and 
dust problems. 
6 
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Mr. Netzeband conducted certain dust collecting tests 
in and around these premises for a number of weeks. The 
instrument with which he collected dust was a device 
which had an orifice of ten microns and the dust count 
was made only on particles of five microns or less. Parti-
cles of this small size are classified as industrial dust. 
The inhalation of this type of matter results in definite 
physiological detriments. 
Keferring to the analysis made by Dr. Jones on the 
size of dust particles, Exhibits DDDD, EEEE, FFFF, it 
will be seen that very little of the dust emitted from this 
plant was of this size and so the conclusion of Mr. Netze-
band would have no probative value in this case. It 
should also be known that no method whereby dust fall 
could be measured was undertaken by defendant, nor 
was any procedure availed of by him to measure the 
type of dust that was being transmitted and which could 
be seen visually as coming from the premises of defend-
ant. 
Mr. Irvine conducted tests with sound equipment 
which purported to indicate the intensity of the sound 
caused by this plant compared to the intensity of the nor-
mal sounds in this vicinity when the plant was not operat-
ing and compared to various noise factors in different 
districts in Salt Lake City. Among his findings were 
readings taken at the crusher while it was in operation 
and these were extremely high. He made tests on October 
17, and October 18, 1950, while the plant was operating. 
The ones taken on October 17, were at the crusher. On 
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October 18, he took two readings. One of which was at the 
Old Mill, the other was 800 feet from the crusher in 
Draper's front yard. Both of these were made while the 
plant was in operation. The only other readings he took 
while the plant was in operation were on October 30, 
when he took four readings at the Pedler and Draper 
homes. On October 30, the wind in Salt Lake Valley at 
the time these readings were made was toward the North-
west, i.e., from the direction of these properties toward 
the crushing plant at from 19 to 37 miles per hour. Plain-
tiffs called Mr. Franklin Gates, a sound expert, to testify 
in their behalf. He presented charts which showed that 
sound intensity as measured in decibels was a very dif-
ferent thing as compared to loudness as felt by the human 
ear. Mr. Irvine concurred with this principle. These 
charts and the testimony of these experts indicate that 
a slight change in intensity as measured by decibels re-
sults in a substantial increase or decrease in loudness 
as heard by the human ear. It will also be noted that 
Mr. Irvine's findings indicate substantial differences in 
intensity between the times when tests were taken while 
the plant was being operated and while it was shut down. 
The matter of the testimony of these experts is 
mentioned merely to show that the type and method of 
their tests was not effective in controverting positive 
testimony of plaintiffs supported by their expert testi-
mony, photographs, and movies. 
J. B. Walker carried the burden of defendant as to 
practically all the matters appearing in the Statement 
of Fact in defendant's brief. No employee of the crush-
8 
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ing plant was called to deny the fact testified to by plain-
tiffs that the dust from this plant was visually observ-
able over the premises of plaintiffs. 
Considerable evidence was presented by defendant 
through Mr. Walker that dust was produced from Was-
atch Boulevard, Cottonwood Boulevard and by the con-
struction of the Deer Creek aqueduct. As opposed to this 
testimony, plaintiffs testified that they were not bothered 
by dust from these sources and that these same sources 
did not produce dust. The record also shows that the 
roads above mentioned were blacktopped in 1950 and that 
the aqueduct was completed in 1949. This testimony 
produced by defendant could not be effectual in view of 
the fact that the most offensive period of operation of 
this plant was in 1950. 
Exception is taken to the statements appearing on 
pages 2 and 3 of defendant's brief. There it is implied 
that this crushing plant was a major factor in the eco-
nomy of Salt Lake County. Mr. Walker testified to the 
fact that of the $320,000.00 in sales in 1949, only $40,000.-
00 arose from revenue produced by the crushing plant. 
Mr. Walker's testimony as to the production of his opera-
tion also appears to be somewhat exaggerated. He testi-
fied on cross examination (record 1104) that in 1949 his 
gross income was $320,000.00. His income tax report (Ex. 
SSSS) shows gross receipts of $272,000.00, of which 
only $222,000.00 was from concrete products. No receipts 
are shown for unprocessed sand and gravel on this 
exhibit. 
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On direct examination, Mr. Walker tried to make it 
appear that this crushing plant represented a very sub-
stantial investment. On direct and cross examination 
(record 1107 and 1110) he testified positively that the 
crushing plant represented an investment of $308,000.00 
and that the total investment in his overall operation was 
$500,000.00 (record 1110). He was asked to produce his 
income tax returns for 1948 and 1949, which were pre-
sented (Exhibits RRRR and SSSS). They show that in 
1948 this plant had a depreciated value of $116,000.00, 
based on a cost price of $128,000.00. The 1949 income tax 
statement shows an investment in this plant of $145,000.-
00, depreciated to $119,000.00. 
Relative values of investments may have some bear-
ing in a nuisance case, but in this case it is fair to say that 
the investment in this gravel plant is far less than the 
investment plaintiffs and their neighbors had made in 
the surrounding area at the time this plant was built. 
Some evidence was received with regard to the ex-
istence of other sand and gravel operations in the South-
east section of Salt Lake County. There is no evidence 
that dust, if any, produced by such operations affected 
these plaintiffs in any manner. 
Mr. Walker's testimony varied considerably from the 
obvious facts. This was illustrated in his testimony as to 
the production and amount of dust and noise, the exist-
ence of right of ways, and as to his investment. His evi-
dence on the material matters involved in this action 
10 
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was not received favorably by the trial court, and it is 
submitted that the trial court's action in failing to give 
credence to this testimony was proper. 
n 
NO ERROR WAS MADE BY THE COURT IN ALLOW-
ING PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND OR IN RECEIVING EVI-
DENCE ON THE ISSUE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE. 
Appellant's second point commencing at Page 74 
in their brief argues to the effect that the Court erred in 
allowing an amendment and in hearing evidence on the 
issue of attractive nuisance. 
The theory of plaintiffs on this point was that the 
presence of these conveyors and machinery at a place 
where they were easily accessible to children interferred 
with the comfortable enjoyment of their life and prop-
erty. Any activity which does this is under our statute 
(R.S.TJ. 104-56-1) declared to be a nuisance. 
The evidence submitted in support of this allegation 
consisted of testimony to the effect that children of this 
neighborhood were in the habit of playing around this 
heavy equipment and climbing on to the ends of these 
conveyor belts which were a considerable distance from 
the ground. Also that the storage piles presented a dan-
gerous condition due to the fact that the sand might slide, 
thereby burying a child or that a child might fall in the 
cone and drop into the center of such pile and thereby 
become suffocated or injured by the equipment located 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
under the pile. The evidence is undisputed that this plant 
was left unguarded and unattended at the times the chil-
dren were found playing there. 
It would seem to require no argument that such a 
dangerous condition being made immediately available 
to children of tender years would interfere with the com-
fort and enjoyment of their parents. 
The maintenance or operation of devices inherently 
dangerous to occupants of adjacent lands is subject to 
injunction. This principle was decided in a recent Cali-
fornia case of Alanso v. Hills, 214 P. 2d 50 Cal. (1950). 
In this case blasting on the premises of the defendant was 
enjoined by those living in the immediate vicinity. This 
case and the cases collected there hold that negligence 
need not be proved as is contended by appellant. 
Appellant cites a case and a treatise which expounds 
the general principals of attractive nuisance. No cases 
are cited which support its contention in this case. 
The only objection made to this amendment and the 
evidence admitted thereunder was that this evidence 
"must have influenced the Court" in making its finding 
and that there was a sharp or close question of fact pre-
sented by the evidence. 
The proposition of this evidence influencing the trial 
court cannot be sustained because the trial court made 
no findings to the effect that the business conducted by 
defendant amounted to an attractive nuisance. The trial 
court confined its findings upon which it based a nuisance 
12 
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to the presence of dust, noise, and flashing lights. The 
evidence was sufficient to support a finding of nuisance 
on these grounds and the appellant herein makes no ob-
jection to this finding on these grounds. 
The other argument made by appellant to the effect 
that there was a close question of fact and a sharp conflict 
in the evidence is also without merit. A reading of this 
record and an examination of the exhibits submitted 
shows conclusively that the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence is in favor and upholds the findings of the trial 
court as made. 
Appellant could have insisted that findings be made 
on this particular fact. In all likelihood such a finding 
would have been to the effect that the existence of this 
crushing plant did not constitute an attractive nuisance 
so far as the children of plaintiffs were concerned and 
that its presence did not affect their comfortable enjoy-
ment of property. The failure of the trial court to find 
that this fact existed implies a negative finding and 
shows conclusively that the trial court did not consider 
this factor in arriving at its decision which was based 
on grounds it enumerated. 
Briefly, defendant's contention on this point stands 
unsupported by authority and is to the effect that the 
introduction of this issue and evidence prejudiced the 
Judge's decision in respondents' favor. It is submitted 
that such a contention is without merit and wholly over-
13 
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looks the finding of the Court and over-whelming weight 
of plaintiff's evidence supporting such finding to which 
objection is not made. 
III. 
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE IS IN PROPER FORM 
AND THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION 
TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS UPON DEFENDANT'S USE OF 
ITS PROPERTY IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE ON THIS 
ISSUE. 
Upon the trial of this case, the court was presented 
with the problem of whether a nuisance existed or 
whether it did not. The pleadings were so framed. The 
only defenses presented were (1) laches and (2) denial 
of the fact that a nuisance condition was present. 
The contention of defendant that the court should 
have limited its injunctive order would have some merit 
if defendant in its pleading had admitted the fact of nuis-
ance and presented a scheme or method whereby such a 
nuisance could be eliminated, if possible, by certain me-
chanical or scientific processes. In such case the court 
could then determine whether such changes would pro-
duce the desired result and rule on that matter. This pro-
cedure was followed in the Utah case of Ludlow v. Colo-
rado Animal By-Products Company, 137 P. 2d 347, Utah 
(1943). 
There are numerous cases where this type of defense 
has been made. The courts under such evidence have 
permitted a continuance of the activity which had there-
14 
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tofore resulted in a nuisance under new or anticipated 
procedures which were pleaded and proved at the trial. 
That is the situation in the cases cited in defendant's 
brief. 
There might be numerous ways and different pro-
cedures whereby defendant's plant in this case could be 
operated so as not to create this abundant dust and loud 
noise, such as housing the crusher and the application of 
liberal supplies of water. The trial court cannot, and 
should not be required to make an independent investi-
gation of the methods involved in the processing of sand 
and gravel and from such investigation determine if there 
is any manner under which the nuisance feature of such 
an activity can be controlled. Then, after such investiga-
tion, restrict the operation of a given plant until the con-
ditions that have been discovered by the court are com-
plied with. This, obviously, is not the duty of the court. 
The trial court is only required to find facts which have 
been properly pleaded and presented by way of evidence 
to it. That is just exactly what the court did in this case. 
It is too late in this case for this defendant to raise this 
particular problem. 
Respondents do not deny that the operation of a 
gravel processing plant is a legal business. There have 
been numerous cases decided, both in this jurisdiction 
and others, which declare that an activity which pro-
duces loud noise and which results in dust and other for-
eign substances being deposited on other people's prop-
erty is a nuisance. In these cases such activity was ad-
15 
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mittedly a lawful occupation. These cases are collected 
in an annotation at 11 A.L.K. 1401. This annotation 
is entitled "Dust as Nuisance." Our Supreme Court has 
held that noise is a nuisance in Brough v. JJte Stampede 
Association 142 P. 2d 670. Also dust is a nuisance in 
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Company, 231 P. 
813. 
At this point it is proper to note that the trial court 
did not enjoin this defendant's operation of a gravel 
plant at this particular place. A proposed decree to this 
effect was not executed by the court. The decree as 
signed enjoins the defendant from operating its gravel 
pit and process plant including the storing of different 
products and the operation of heavy equipment upon 
these premises so as to create a nuisance affecting plain-
tiffs. .. , . , , -
The language of this decree leaves the door open to 
defendant to continue the operation of this establish-
ment in the event it can be operated without creating 
noises and excessive amounts of dust. No objection to 
this form of decree was made by defendant at or after 
the time it was entered by the Court nor was any scheme 
or device for the control of this dust and noise pro-
pounded when the matter of the form of this decree was 
being argued by respective counsel. 
Appellant cites the case of Vowinchel v. N. Clark and 
Son, 216 Cal. 156, 136 Pac. (2nd) 733. In this case plain-
tiff brought a nuisance action against a manufacturer 
of pipe and tile. The factory had been adjacent to plain-
16 
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tiff's premises for a number of years. The objectionable 
feature of this operation was the addition of four fur-
naces on the side of the plant next to plaintiff. The court 
viewed the premises and held that these particular fur-
naces were objectionable and forbade their use. The de-
fendant in this case, after the trial and on the motion 
for a new trial, offered to build a sound and fireproof 
wall, but the court refused to accept this solution. This 
case can by no means be cited as authority for the propo-
sition that the court on its own initiative should investi-
gate factors which would abate a nuisance. 
Appellant cites the case of Williams v. Bluebird 
Laundry Company, 259 Pac. 484. The language of the 
decree in this case appears to be the same as the lan-
guage in the case at bar. The same objection to it was 
made as is being made in this case, and the court held 
that such an objection is without merit. The court in the 
Bluebird Laundry Company case cites the case of Judson 
v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Company, 157 Cal. 168, 
106 Pac. 581. The language of the decree in the Suburban 
Gas Company case was the same as in the case at bar. 
The defendant there made the same objection as is being 
made here, yet the court held the language proper. The 
California court said: 
"It is these objectionable emanations, the 
same sort of nuisance which had caused the annoy-
ance to plaintiffs, that are enjoined. Even if true, 
it is no objection to the validity of an order that 
there is room for difference of opinion as to what 
noises are loud, what odors are offensive, and 
what smoke is black." 
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The court then goes on to say that under this form 
of a decree, both the defendant and the plaintiffs are 
sufficiently protected. 
The court continued: 
"If the operation of the defendant's plant 
should be deemed by the plaintiffs to create such 
noises or pollution of the atmosphere as to be 
deleterious to their health or offensive to their 
senses, and should they produce competent and 
satisfactory evidence that any or all of these ob-
jectionable features were injuring or destroying 
their health, we think they would be entitled to 
relief under the terms of the judgment, otherwise 
not." 
These two California cases hold squarely that a de-
cree in the language of this case is sufficiently definite 
and can be enforced under existing legal procedures. The 
only distinction that appellant makes between this case 
and the two California cases, which appear to be exactly 
in point, is that the operation of a gravel plant is a more 
complicated process than the operation of a steam laun-
dry and a factory which produces gas. It is submitted 
that a process which merely grades and reduces the size 
of rock is in no way as complicated nor are there as many 
processes used in such activity as there is in a business 
which reduces coal or some other combustible to gas, 
or to the laundering of various types of clothing. 
The court's directive states clearly that the process-
ing and storage of this material created dust, and that 
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the operation of equipment created noise, and the decree 
of the court is that this activity be conducted so as not 
to produce dust or noise. 
The next objection to the form of this decree is that 
it refers to the Findings of Fact in the event more par-
ticularity is desired and for reference as to the manner 
of operation. Such a reference does not render the decree 
inoperative. It is submitted that such practice is the 
better procedure, as indicated in Barron and Holtzoff, 
Section 1436, page 314-15, Vol. I l l , where it is stated that 
the order should furnish the defendant with a direct and 
succinct statement of his wrongful acts and should not 
incorporate lengthy and verbose findings. 
It is also true that under our practice the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree are 
considered more or less as a whole, and represent the 
court's final determination of a given lawsuit. Rule 52A, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provide that, 
"The court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon and 
direct the entry of the appropriate judgment," 
This was done in this case. The findings of fact represent 
the grounds for relief and the decree granted the ap-
propriate relief. 
Appellant maintains that this reference to the find-
ings violates Rule 65A (D) Utah Civil Procedure, which 
provides that every order granting an injunction shall 
be specific at all times and shall describe in detail and 
not by reference to the complaint or other document the 
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act or acts sought to be restrained. This is a codification 
of the common law rule. And the Bluebird Laundry 
and Suburban Gas Company cases above quoted hold 
squarely that the order and decree in this case is suf-
ficiently specific and does sufficiently describe the acts 
to be restrained. 
Commencing at page 105 of appellant's brief the 
argument is presented that there exist other sand and 
gravel operations in the general area and that the evi-
dence showed there were other dust producing agencies. 
This is in direct conflict to the weight of the evidence. 
As to this argument, the undisputed evidence is that these 
people had lived in this neighborhood for many years 
and were never disturbed by dust or noise previous to the 
operation of defendant's plant. In fact, the testimony 
of plaintiffs was that the area was unusually quiet and 
dust free. It is also undisputed that these other gravel 
plants mentioned were in existence before defendant's 
plant was built, yet these plaintiffs had no cause of 
complaint. 
• 
Even if it had been shown that other purported 
sources indicated by appellant annoyed these plaintiffs, 
such would not be a defense. The rule in this respect 
is clearly stated in the Vowinckel case, supra, 13 Pac. 2d 
at page 737, where the defendant contended that the 
plaintiff in addition to itself had as neighbors an air-
port on the North and a railroad on the South. Citing a 
long line of California cases the court declares the rule 
to be: 
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"The fact that other sources of possible dis-
comfort to plaintiff existed in the neighborhood 
of his property is no defense to an action of this 
kind. * * * Nor will the adoption of the most ap-
proved appliances and methods of production 
justify the continuance of that which in spite of 
them remains a nuisance." 
The whole problem of the form of this decree and its 
failure to specify or permit the operation of this gravel 
plant under some kind of a scheme which the judge should 
have independently discovered has been rendered moot. 
The file in this case has been continued and will be of-
fered upon the oral argument hereof. Subsequent to the 
entry of this decree and in the summer of 1951, while 
this appeal was being perfected, an order to show cause 
was issued by the trial court, upon which a contempt 
order against this defendant and J. B. Walker was en-
tered. After further hearing defendant finally advanced 
a proposal which in its estimation would reduce the dust 
and noise factor incident to the operation of this crush-
ing plant. The trial court heard this evidence and is 
allowing defendant to operate after these features are 
constructed and installed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. So far as the nuisance question is concerned, 
Article 8 Section 9 of the Utah Constitution may not be 
invoked in this case as requested by appellant, This 
particular rule of law is to the effect that in equity cases 
the appellate court can investigate the findings and as-
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certain whether or not the proof justifies the findings. 
In this case no objection is made to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings of a nuisance, and 
therefore the appellate court is under no duty or obliga-
tion to investigate or go into the evidence. 
2. Finally, appellant in their conclusions request 
that this court reform this judgment by defining methods, 
instruments and agencies, and to define a maximum tol-
erance of dust fall in this case. For this court to do this 
it would have to make an independent investigation as 
to permissible limits of dust fall with no aid from appel-
lant by way of evidence having been presented on this 
subject at the trial of the case and without the aid of 
having anything submitted to this court. Such a proposal 
appears upon its face to be beyond the scope of review. 
3. As indicated by the extensiveness of this record, 
both by way of oral testimony and exhibits, it is readily 
apparent that considerable time, effort and money was 
contributed by the parties hereto in presenting the matter 
fully to the trial court. It is submitted that such evidence 
preponderates heavily in favor of respondents and that 
the trial court's findings and decision were in all respects 
correct and proper. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE AND MULLINER 
Attorneys for all Plaintiffs and Respondents 
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